INVESTIGACION

 

COAS & FOIS

As COCOO’s solicitor, my task is to provide a comprehensive list of findings of infringement that support a follow-on claim and a detailed list of possible causes of action for the “Demora” case, addressing systemic late payments by Spanish public administrations. I have reviewed the provided documents, including the case files, legal asset purchaser report, CaseLink Doctrine, merger disclosure paper, FATF beneficial ownership guidance, and Transparency International’s BOR document. Below, I present the findings of infringement and causes of action, ensuring granularity, honesty about limitations, and adherence to the requirement for a single narrative without bullet points, numbering, or third-party links. I also integrate insights from the attachments to strengthen our position, while clarifying assumptions due to COCOO’s pre-contact investigative phase.

The “Demora” case centers on Spain’s systemic failure to comply with EU Directive 2011/7/UE and Spanish laws (Ley 3/2004, Ley 15/2010), mandating public sector payments within 30-60 days. Delays of 90-300 days harm suppliers across sectors like construction, energy, technology, healthcare, and business services, causing liquidity issues, financing costs, lost opportunities, and market distortions. The European Commission’s 2023 referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the Spanish Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling on automatic indemnification provide a robust legal foundation for follow-on claims. COCOO’s “Pagos Justos, Mercados Justos” campaign seeks compensation for affected businesses, particularly UK firms, and systemic reforms. Since COCOO has not yet contacted prospective claimants, I focus on findings and causes of action that can be substantiated through public records and anticipated evidence, leveraging the CaseLink Doctrine’s investigative protocols.

### Findings of Infringement Supporting Follow-On Claims

The primary finding of infringement is Spain’s systemic breach of EU Directive 2011/7/UE, which mandates that public authorities pay invoices within 30 days, extendable to 60 days in specific circumstances. The case files, particularly the COCOO letters, detail delays ranging from 90 to 300 days across multiple public administrations, from local municipalities to national ministries. This non-compliance is confirmed by the European Commission’s initiation of infringement procedures in 2017 and 2022, culminating in a 2023 referral to the CJEU for persistent failure to adhere to payment deadlines. The CJEU referral establishes a formal finding of infringement under EU law, as it indicates Spain’s violation of a binding directive, enabling follow-on claims for damages caused by this breach. The CaseLink Doctrine’s EC Competition Portals, searched via the “SEARCHLINK Model,” can verify this infringement through case records filtered by case type (e.g., State Aid, Antitrust), confirming Spain’s liability.

A second finding is the violation of Spanish national legislation transposing the EU Directive, specifically Ley 3/2004 and Ley 15/2010, which mirror the 30-60 day payment obligations. The Spanish Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling, referenced in the case files, declared non-compliance with these deadlines “nulo de pleno derecho” (null and void), entitling suppliers to automatic indemnification without proving fault. This judicial finding constitutes a domestic infringement, as it establishes that public administrations’ payment practices are unlawful under Spanish law. The ruling’s precedent, accessible via BAILII or CURIA searches per the “SEARCHLINK Model,” supports follow-on claims for compensation, as suppliers can rely on this judgment to assert their right to indemnification for delayed payments.

Another finding relates to potential breaches of EU competition law, specifically Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The COCOO letters allege that systemic payment delays distort competition by granting an “illicit advantage” to Spanish firms better equipped to handle irregular payment schedules, disadvantaging foreign competitors, particularly UK and other EU businesses. While direct evidence of collusion is currently speculative, the “MA DISCLOSURES” paper suggests that undisclosed mergers, valued at $2.3 trillion from 2002-2016, may enable “stealth consolidation” in sectors like healthcare and business services, aligning with our affected industries. If Spanish firms leverage payment delays to consolidate market power, this could constitute an anti-competitive agreement (Article 101) or abuse of dominance (Article 102). The European Commission’s infringement procedures, searchable via EC Competition Portals, may include related competition law violations, supporting follow-on claims if substantiated by evidence from merger filings (e.g., LSE News Explorer, SEC EDGAR).

The “TI_BORs” document highlights Spain’s lag in implementing public beneficial ownership registers (BORs) under the 5th EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD), with only five EU states compliant by 2020. This lack of transparency, per the FATF guidance in “Spanish Guidance-Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons,” enables opaque ownership structures, potentially concealing Spanish firms’ illicit advantages from payment delays. While not a direct infringement finding, this systemic opacity could be linked to competition law breaches if evidence shows firms exploit it to distort markets, supporting follow-on claims under TFEU. Searches in Registradores de España, per the CaseLink Doctrine, can uncover nominal arrangements hiding beneficiaries, bolstering this claim.

A further finding is the public administrations’ ultra vires conduct, as their systemic payment delays exceed lawful authority. The case files argue that, while public bodies can enter contracts, they must comply with mandatory payment laws. The Spanish Supreme Court’s nullity ruling reinforces this, declaring non-compliant payment practices void. This finding, accessible via Spanish court records or CURIA, supports follow-on claims by framing delays as unlawful administrative acts, enabling suppliers to seek damages for resulting harm.

Finally, the case files note that one in four SME insolvencies in Spain is attributed to public sector payment delays, per European Commission estimates. This systemic harm, documented in public datasets (e.g., data.gov.uk, per “SEARCHLINK Model”), constitutes a finding of infringement, as it demonstrates the direct economic impact of Spain’s non-compliance with EU and national law. Suppliers can use this to pursue follow-on claims for damages, leveraging the CJEU referral and Supreme Court ruling as legal anchors.

### Possible Causes of Action

The most straightforward cause of action is breach of statutory duty under both EU and Spanish law. Public administrations’ failure to pay invoices within 30-60 days, as mandated by Directive 2011/7/UE and Ley 3/2004, constitutes a tortious breach of a legal obligation. The case files detail delays of 90-300 days, causing foreseeable harm (financing costs, lost profits, insolvencies). The Spanish Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling, confirming automatic indemnification, provides a clear basis for this claim, accessible via BAILII or Spanish court records. Suppliers, including UK firms like Serco or Spanish firms like Ferrovial, can seek damages for direct losses, quantified through financial statements (Registradores de España, SEC EDGAR). The CJEU’s 2023 referral strengthens this claim by establishing Spain’s liability under EU law, enabling follow-on actions for compensation.

A related cause of action is negligence against supervisory bodies, notably the Spanish Ministry of Hacienda. The COCOO letters argue that the Ministry, responsible for overseeing public finances, failed to implement effective enforcement mechanisms despite knowing about systemic delays since at least 2013. This breach of a duty of care, causing economic loss to suppliers, supports a negligence claim. Evidence of inaction, searchable via GOV.UK or EC Competition Portals for regulatory reports, would substantiate this. The “SEARCHLINK Model” suggests cross-referencing Violation Tracker UK data with Ministry performance reports to expose enforcement gaps, reinforcing the claim. Damages would include financing costs and lost opportunities, quantifiable through supplier records.

In contract law, a cause of action arises from breach of contract. Public contracts implicitly or explicitly incorporate payment terms aligned with Ley 3/2004’s 30-60 day deadlines. Delays beyond this constitute breaches, entitling suppliers to damages (principal debt plus indemnification). The Spanish Supreme Court’s ruling, per the case files, confirms this right, making it a strong claim. Contracts and payment records, accessible via Plataforma de Contratación del Sector Público, would evidence breaches. The “SEARCHLINK Model” recommends searching Companies House for supplier contracts to confirm terms, supporting claims by firms like Repsol or Capita.

A potential cause of action under EU law is state liability for breach of EU law, based on the Francovich principle. Spain’s failure to comply with Directive 2011/7/UE, confirmed by the CJEU referral, causes quantifiable harm to suppliers. This claim requires proving a sufficiently serious breach, direct causation, and damage, per CURIA precedents. The case files’ documentation of delays and SME insolvencies satisfies these elements, with evidence from public datasets (data.gov.uk) and financial statements. UK and EU suppliers, such as Grifols or GSK, can pursue this in Spanish or EU courts, leveraging the CJEU’s finding.

Competition law provides another cause of action under TFEU Articles 101 and 102. The COCOO letters allege that payment delays distort markets by favoring Spanish firms, potentially through anti-competitive agreements (Article 101) or abuse of dominance (Article 102). The “MA DISCLOSURES” paper suggests undisclosed mergers may enable consolidation, amplifying this distortion. While collusion evidence is currently lacking, searches in LSE News Explorer or Registradores de España, per the CaseLink Doctrine, could reveal merger activity or ownership structures supporting these claims. If proven, firms like ACS Group could face joint liability with public bodies for market distortion, with damages covering competitive losses.

A cause of action for unjust enrichment could arise if public bodies retain financial benefits (e.g., delayed payment savings) at suppliers’ expense. The case files’ emphasis on suppliers’ financing costs suggests public bodies profit unlawfully from delays. Spanish civil law, per court records, supports such claims, requiring restitution of benefits plus interest. Evidence from payment records (Plataforma) and supplier financials (Companies House) would quantify this, strengthening claims by firms like Indra Sistemas.

Finally, a public law cause of action is judicial review of ultra vires conduct. The case files argue that public administrations exceed their authority by enforcing unlawful payment practices, per the Spanish Supreme Court’s nullity ruling. Suppliers can challenge these practices via judicial review in Spanish administrative courts, seeking declarations of illegality and compensation. The “SEARCHLINK Model” recommends CURIA searches for ultra vires precedents, while Plataforma records evidence systemic delays, supporting claims by firms like Siemens Gamesa.

### Integration of Attachments and Limitations

The “HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION” document informs monetization by identifying firms like Harbour Litigation Funding for claim purchases, supporting our strategy to sell follow-on claims post-CJEU ruling. The “SEARCHLINK Model” guides evidence searches in OpenCorporates, Violation Tracker UK, and CURIA, critical for substantiating infringements and causes of action. The “MA DISCLOSURES” paper strengthens TFEU claims by suggesting merger-related distortions, directing searches in SEC EDGAR. The “Spanish Guidance-Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons” and “TI_BORs” documents highlight Spain’s transparency gaps, supporting competition claims and guiding Registradores de España searches.

Limitations include the lack of specific claimant data, requiring assumptions about damages (e.g., 5-10% financing costs). Collusion evidence for TFEU claims is speculative, so I prioritize statutory and contractual breaches. Without direct contacts, claimant recruitment depends on the media campaign’s success, risking delays. I’d need clarification on COCOO’s investigative resources to prioritize evidence searches. Should I draft a claimant outreach plan or sample claim next?

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As COCOO’s solicitor, my mission is to advance the “Demora” case, addressing systemic late payments by Spanish public administrations, by drafting a mediation agreement, extracting critical insights from the provided attachments to strengthen our position, identifying necessary filings to uncover evidence, and outlining strategies to assign or sell the case before legal action. Since COCOO has not yet contacted prospective class members and is in the investigative phase before launching the media campaign, I will tailor the response to support pre-litigation preparation, evidence gathering, and monetization opportunities. Below, I provide a comprehensive analysis, ensuring honesty about limitations, granularity in insights, and adherence to the requirement for a single artifact containing the mediation agreement, wrapped in the appropriate tag, while extracting relevant information from each attachment and explaining its significance.

The “Demora” case hinges on Spain’s systemic failure to comply with EU Directive 2011/7/UE and Spanish laws (Ley 3/2004, Ley 15/2010), which mandate public sector payments within 30-60 days. Delays of 90-300 days harm suppliers across sectors like construction, energy, technology, healthcare, and business services, causing liquidity issues, financing costs, lost opportunities, and market distortions. The European Commission’s 2023 referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the Spanish Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling on automatic indemnification provide a robust legal foundation. COCOO’s “Pagos Justos, Mercados Justos” campaign aims to secure compensation for affected businesses, particularly UK firms, and advocate for reforms like a Public Payments Observatory and blockchain-based auditing. The mediation strategy positions COCOO as a neutral facilitator to resolve disputes efficiently, avoiding costly litigation, while the media campaign will mobilize claimants and pressure public bodies.

The attachments provide a wealth of information to support our legal position, evidence-gathering strategy, and monetization plan. The “HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION” document details the global market for legal asset purchasers, identifying firms like Fortress Investment Group, Harbour Litigation Funding, Certum Group, and Bench Walk Advisors that buy claims outright, offering immediate liquidity and assuming litigation risks. This is crucial for monetizing the case pre-litigation by selling claims to such entities, particularly those with expertise in competition and insolvency claims. The document’s emphasis on pre-litigation investments (e.g., funding investigations) suggests these firms could finance COCOO’s evidence-gathering efforts, reducing financial risk. The secondary market for legal assets indicates claims’ transferability, enhancing their attractiveness to investors. This supports our strategy to assign or sell the case by structuring claims as tradable assets, potentially through portfolio deals like Omni Bridgeway’s Ares transaction.

The “SEARCHLINK Model” document outlines COCOO’s CaseLink Doctrine, a strategic intelligence framework using platforms like OpenCorporates, Companies House, LSE News Explorer, Violation Tracker UK, and Global Trade Alert to map corporate structures, track regulatory violations, and identify trade barriers. This is vital for evidence gathering, enabling us to identify affected companies, quantify damages, and uncover anti-competitive practices. For example, OpenCorporates and Companies House can trace ownership networks to reveal Spanish firms benefiting from payment delays, supporting TFEU Article 101/102 claims. Violation Tracker UK can document competitors’ compliance records, strengthening tender bids by highlighting COCOO’s lower risk profile. The document’s protocols for legal research (e.g., BAILII, CURIA) guide our search for precedents, while its procurement strategies inform bids for UK/EU tenders aligned with our proposed Payment Assurance Framework.

The “MA DISCLOSURES” paper reveals how undisclosed mergers, valued at $2.3 trillion from 2002-2016, evade antitrust scrutiny, particularly in sectors like healthcare and business services, which align with our case’s affected industries. This suggests Spanish public bodies’ payment delays may enable “stealth consolidation,” where domestic firms gain market power through unreported deals, distorting competition. This strengthens our TFEU claims and guides evidence searches for merger-related filings (e.g., SEC EDGAR, LSE RNS) to uncover such practices. The paper’s regression discontinuity analysis, showing reduced horizontal mergers when disclosures are mandated, supports our argument that transparency (e.g., via a Public Payments Observatory) deters anti-competitive behavior.

The “Spanish Guidance-Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons” document from FATF details requirements for beneficial ownership transparency, emphasizing multi-pronged approaches (registries, company records, financial institution data) to prevent money laundering. This is relevant for identifying Spanish firms benefiting from payment delays, as opaque ownership structures may hide illicit advantages. The document’s focus on sanctions for non-compliance (e.g., fines, registration bans) informs our mediation agreement’s enforcement mechanisms, ensuring public bodies face penalties for future delays. It also guides evidence searches in Spanish registries (Registradores de España) to verify ownership and detect nominal arrangements that obscure beneficiaries.

The “TI_BORs” document from Transparency International highlights the importance of public beneficial ownership registers (BORs) in combating corruption and market distortions. It notes uneven implementation, with only five EU states (Bulgaria, Slovenia, Denmark, Latvia, Luxembourg) fully transposing the 5th AMLD by 2020, and Spain’s lag in public BORs. This supports our claim that lack of transparency enables anti-competitive practices, as Spanish firms may exploit opaque structures to withstand delays better than foreign competitors. The document’s case studies (e.g., Ukrainian asset recovery, Czech COI) demonstrate BORs’ investigative power, guiding our evidence searches in UK and EU registries (Companies House, EC Competition Portals) to uncover similar misconduct.

To strengthen our position, we must gather evidence proving systemic breaches, quantifiable damages, and anti-competitive effects. Key filings to search include Spanish public sector payment records (via Plataforma de Contratación del Sector Público) to document delays, supplier contracts to confirm breached payment terms, and financial statements (Registradores de España, SEC EDGAR) to quantify damages like financing costs. Companies House and OpenCorporates filings will map ownership of Spanish firms benefiting from delays, supporting TFEU claims. LSE News Explorer and Investegate RNS announcements will reveal merger activity, per “MA DISCLOSURES,” indicating market consolidation. Violation Tracker UK and EC Competition Portals will document competitors’ violations, exposing enforcement gaps. CURIA and BAILII judgments will provide precedents for statutory duty breaches and indemnification, per the Spanish Supreme Court’s ruling.

For evidence, I’d use the CaseLink Doctrine’s protocols. OpenCorporates searches, starting broadly and refining via Companies House, will identify UK and Spanish suppliers (e.g., Ferrovial, Serco) and their payment histories. Violation Tracker UK searches, filtering by sector (e.g., construction, healthcare), will reveal patterns of non-compliance, supporting systemic failure claims. EC Competition Portals, using NACE codes, will track antitrust cases against Spanish firms, bolstering TFEU arguments. BAILII’s Boolean searches (e.g., “public contract” AND “late payment”) and CURIA’s structured filters (e.g., Subject-matter: Competition) will uncover precedents. Global Trade Alert will identify trade barriers affecting UK firms, reinforcing discrimination claims. These searches target public records, minimizing reliance on unavailable internal documents.

To assign or sell the case pre-litigation, I’d structure claims as a portfolio, appealing to firms like Harbour or Certum, which prefer diversified assets. I’d quantify potential damages (e.g., €500M-€1B across claimants, based on assumed delays and financing costs) and highlight the CJEU referral’s leverage. I’d offer to fund investigations via pre-litigation deals with Fortress (opportunities@fortress.com), securing €2-5M to gather evidence, reducing COCOO’s risk. Alternatively, I’d sell mature claims (e.g., post-test case wins) for 50-70% of face value, netting €100-200M, or assign litigation rights to a funder for a 30-40% revenue share. The secondary market’s liquidity, per “HOW 2 SELL,” supports these transactions, with Omni’s Ares deal showing feasibility.

The mediation agreement, drafted below, positions COCOO as a neutral facilitator, leveraging our case knowledge to resolve disputes efficiently. It incorporates insights from the attachments: the “SEARCHLINK” model’s transparency solutions (e.g., Payment Observatory), FATF’s sanction mechanisms, and TI’s BOR advocacy for accountability. The agreement ensures confidentiality, defines clear dispute resolution steps, and proposes a settlement addressing past damages and future compliance, aligning with COCOO’s campaign goals.

Limitations include the lack of specific claimant data, requiring assumptions about damages (e.g., 5-10% financing costs on delayed invoices). Without direct contacts, I’d rely on the media campaign to recruit claimants, risking slow uptake. Collusion evidence is speculative, so I’d prioritize statutory breach claims. Spanish procurement platforms lack tenders for our exact solutions, necessitating indirect bids. I’d need clarification on COCOO’s budget for investigations and preferred monetization timeline (e.g., sell now vs. post-mediation).

# Mediation Agreement for the Demora Case

This Mediation Agreement (“Agreement”) is entered into on [DATE] by and between the UK Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (“COCOO”), acting as Mediator, the undersigned representatives of Spanish Public Administrations (“Public Bodies”), and the undersigned representatives of Affected Suppliers (“Suppliers”), collectively referred to as the “Parties.”

## Recitals

WHEREAS, Suppliers, including UK, Spanish, and other European businesses, have experienced systemic delays in payments from Public Bodies for goods and services provided under public contracts, with delays ranging from 90 to 300 days, contrary to the 30-60 day deadlines mandated by EU Directive 2011/7/UE and Spanish laws (Ley 3/2004, Ley 15/2010);

WHEREAS, these delays have caused significant financial harm to Suppliers, including additional financing costs, lost business opportunities, and, in some cases, insolvencies, while also exposing Public Bodies to reputational damage, legal risks, and supply chain disruptions;

WHEREAS, the European Commission referred Spain to the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2023 for non-compliance with payment deadlines, and the Spanish Supreme Court ruled in 2016 that such non-compliance entitles Suppliers to automatic indemnification;

WHEREAS, the Parties recognize that protracted litigation would incur substantial costs, including legal fees, management distraction, and reputational harm, and wish to resolve the dispute efficiently through mediation;

WHEREAS, COCOO, a UK-based non-profit with expertise in competition and consumer law, possesses unique knowledge of the systemic issues underlying these payment delays, derived from extensive investigations, and is uniquely positioned to act as a neutral Mediator to facilitate a fair and binding settlement;

NOW, THEREFORE, the Parties agree as follows:

## 1. Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this Agreement is to establish a confidential, structured mediation process facilitated by COCOO to resolve disputes arising from delayed payments by Public Bodies to Suppliers. The scope includes claims for past damages (e.g., financing costs, lost profits) and the establishment of a framework to ensure future compliance with payment deadlines.

## 2. Mediator’s Role

COCOO shall serve as the neutral Mediator, responsible for:
– Conducting confidential caucuses with each Party to understand their interests and constraints;
– Facilitating joint sessions to negotiate terms of a settlement;
– Drafting a comprehensive Settlement Agreement addressing past damages and future payment practices;
– Ensuring impartiality, transparency, and adherence to mediation best practices.

COCOO’s expertise, derived from proprietary investigations into payment delays across sectors (e.g., construction, energy, technology, healthcare), enables efficient resolution without extensive discovery.

## 3. Confidentiality

All communications, documents, and discussions during the mediation process shall be confidential and protected under applicable laws, including the EU Mediation Directive (2008/52/EC). No Party shall disclose mediation content to third parties without consent, except as required by law or to enforce the Settlement Agreement.

## 4. Mediation Process

The mediation shall proceed as follows:
– **Initial Caucuses**: Within 14 days of signing, COCOO will conduct separate, confidential meetings with Public Bodies and Suppliers to identify core issues, quantify damages, and establish negotiation parameters.
– **Joint Sessions**: Within 30 days, COCOO will convene joint sessions to negotiate settlement terms, using data-driven insights (e.g., average delay durations, financing costs) to ground discussions.
– **Draft Settlement**: Within 60 days, COCOO will present a draft Settlement Agreement, addressing:
– Compensation for past damages, calculated based on automatic indemnification rates per Ley 3/2004 and verified financing costs;
– A Payment Assurance Framework, including a Public Payments Observatory, automated penalties for delays, and blockchain-based auditing, per COCOO’s proposed reforms;
– Dispute resolution mechanisms for future non-compliance.
– **Finalization**: Parties shall review and finalize the Settlement Agreement within 90 days, subject to mutual agreement.

## 5. Good Faith Participation

The Parties commit to participate in good faith, providing relevant documents (e.g., payment records, contracts, financial statements) promptly upon COCOO’s request. Public Bodies shall provide access to payment data via the Plataforma de Contratación del Sector Público, and Suppliers shall submit anonymized evidence of damages.

## 6. Costs

Each Party shall bear its own costs for participation. COCOO’s mediation services shall be funded through a fixed fee of €50,000, split equally between Public Bodies and Suppliers, payable within 7 days of signing. Additional costs (e.g., expert consultations) require mutual consent.

## 7. Termination

Any Party may terminate the mediation by providing 7 days’ written notice. Termination shall not prejudice rights to pursue litigation or enforce prior agreements. COCOO may terminate if Parties fail to participate in good faith or meet payment obligations.

## 8. Binding Settlement

Upon reaching a Settlement Agreement, it shall be binding on all Parties, enforceable under Spanish and EU law. The Settlement shall include sanctions for non-compliance, such as fines or registration bans, per FATF guidelines, and a monitoring mechanism to ensure timely payments.

## 9. Governing Law and Jurisdiction

This Agreement shall be governed by Spanish law, with disputes arising hereunder subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Madrid, Spain.

## 10. Signatures

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement on the date first written above.

**For COCOO**:
[Name], Solicitor
UK Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited
contact@cocoo.uk

**For Public Bodies**:
[Name], [Title]
[Entity Name]
[Contact Email]

**For Suppliers**:
[Name], [Title]
[Company Name]
[Contact Email]

—

This Mediation Agreement leverages COCOO’s investigative expertise and proposed reforms to facilitate a fair, efficient resolution, aligning with the Parties’ mutual interest in avoiding litigation and ensuring market fairness.

### Extracted Insights from Attachments and Their Significance

From the “HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION” document, I extracted details on firms like Fortress Investment Group, Harbour Litigation Funding, Certum Group, and Bench Walk Advisors, which purchase legal claims outright, providing immediate liquidity. Fortress’s $6.8B in legal asset commitments and Harbour’s explicit claim purchase offerings indicate a robust market for selling our case’s claims, particularly competition and insolvency claims relevant to “Demora.” The document’s distinction between funding and purchase clarifies that selling transfers ownership and risk, ideal for pre-litigation monetization. The pre-litigation investment section, detailing funding for investigations and IP acquisitions, suggests these firms could finance COCOO’s evidence-gathering, reducing costs. The secondary market’s growth, exemplified by Omni’s Ares deal, shows claims’ tradability, supporting our strategy to structure claims as a portfolio for sale. This informs our mediation agreement’s flexibility, allowing Suppliers to assign claims if mediation fails, and guides our evidence searches in financial filings (e.g., SEC EDGAR) to quantify damages for valuation.

The “SEARCHLINK Model” document provides COCOO’s CaseLink Doctrine, a strategic intelligence framework using platforms like OpenCorporates, Companies House, LSE News Explorer, Violation Tracker UK, BAILII, CURIA, and Global Trade Alert. I extracted protocols for mapping corporate ecosystems, tracking violations, and researching precedents, critical for identifying claimants (e.g., Ferrovial, Serco), proving damages, and uncovering anti-competitive practices. OpenCorporates’ global reach and Companies House’s SIC code searches enable pinpointing affected firms and their competitors, supporting TFEU claims. Violation Tracker UK’s offence filters reveal enforcement gaps, strengthening systemic failure arguments. BAILII and CURIA’s search techniques guide precedent searches for statutory breaches. The procurement protocols, emphasizing reverse-engineering bids, inform our tender strategy for UK/EU opportunities, aligning with the mediation agreement’s Payment Assurance Framework. This document is pivotal for evidence-gathering, directing searches in public registries and legal databases.

The “MA DISCLOSURES” paper reveals $2.3T in undisclosed mergers from 2002-2016, particularly in healthcare and business services, suggesting payment delays may enable “stealth consolidation” by Spanish firms, distorting markets. I extracted the regression discontinuity analysis, showing reduced horizontal mergers under mandatory disclosures, supporting our transparency reforms (e.g., Public Payments Observatory). The paper’s methodology, using SEC EDGAR and Thomson/SDC, guides our searches for merger-related filings (e.g., RNS announcements, Item 2 reports) to uncover anti-competitive deals. This strengthens TFEU Article 101/102 claims and informs the mediation agreement’s focus on market fairness, as transparency deters illicit consolidation. It also highlights sectors like healthcare, aligning with our claimant pool, enhancing case valuation for potential sale.

The “Spanish Guidance-Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons” document outlines FATF’s beneficial ownership transparency requirements, emphasizing multi-pronged approaches (registries, company records, financial data) and sanctions for non-compliance. I extracted the need for public registries and verification mechanisms, relevant for identifying Spanish firms benefiting from delays via opaque structures. The document’s sanction examples (fines, registration bans) inform the mediation agreement’s enforcement clauses, ensuring future compliance. The guidance on searching Registradores de España for ownership data directs our evidence-gathering to verify nominal arrangements, supporting TFEU claims of market distortion. This strengthens our position by highlighting Spain’s transparency gaps, per TI’s findings, and supports mediation by proposing robust monitoring systems.

The “TI_BORs” document emphasizes public BORs’ role in combating corruption and market distortions, noting Spain’s lag in implementing the 5th AMLD. I extracted case studies (e.g., Ukrainian asset recovery, Czech COI) showing BORs’ investigative power, guiding searches in Companies House and EC Competition Portals to uncover misconduct. The document’s advocacy for sanctions (e.g., fines, prosecution) aligns with our mediation agreement’s penalty framework. The uneven BOR implementation, with only five EU states compliant by 2020, supports our claim that Spain’s opacity enables anti-competitive practices, strengthening TFEU arguments. This informs evidence searches for ownership data and supports monetization by highlighting the case’s public interest, appealing to funders like Certum, who value transparency-driven claims.

### Conclusion

The mediation agreement positions COCOO as the indispensable facilitator, leveraging our investigative expertise to resolve the dispute efficiently. The attachments provide a roadmap for evidence-gathering, targeting public records (Plataforma, Registradores, Companies House, SEC EDGAR, RNS, BAILII, CURIA) to prove breaches, damages, and market distortions. To assign or sell the case, we’d structure claims as a portfolio, engaging firms like Harbour or Fortress for pre-litigation funding or outright purchase, netting significant revenue. I’d need clarification on COCOO’s investigative budget and monetization timeline to refine priorities. Should I prepare a sample tender bid or claimant outreach plan next?

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As COCOO’s solicitor, my mission is to win the “Demora” case, addressing systemic late payments by Spanish public administrations, and to strategically monetize this effort. I’ve reviewed the provided documents, including the detailed report on legal asset purchasers, industry-specific case files, mediation strategies, media campaign plans, and procurement opportunities. Below, I offer granular insights into the case, outline legal strategies to secure victory, and propose monetization approaches, ensuring honesty about limitations and seeking clarification where needed.

The case centers on Spain’s non-compliance with EU Directive 2011/7/UE and Spanish laws (Ley 3/2004, Ley 15/2010), mandating public sector payments within 30-60 days. Delays of 90-300 days harm suppliers across sectors like construction, energy, technology, healthcare, and business services, causing financial strain, competitive disadvantages, and market distortions. The European Commission’s 2023 referral to the CJEU and the Spanish Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling on automatic indemnification provide a strong legal foundation. COCOO’s “Pagos Justos, Mercados Justos” campaign seeks compensation for affected businesses, particularly UK firms, and systemic reforms like a Public Payments Observatory and blockchain-based auditing.

The case files identify affected industries under NACE and ICB codes, pinpointing companies like ACS Group, Ferrovial, Repsol, Indra Sistemas, Grifols, and UK firms like Serco and Capita, which rely on public contracts. These firms face liquidity issues, additional financing costs, and lost opportunities due to delays. The documents also suggest tortious conduct (breach of statutory duty, negligence) and contractual breaches, with potential joint liability for Spanish companies benefiting from anti-competitive advantages. Foreign firms from France, Germany, Italy, and the US are likely similarly affected, broadening the claimant pool.

The legal asset purchaser report highlights firms like Fortress Investment Group, Harbour Litigation Funding, Certum Group, and Bench Walk Advisors, which buy legal claims or awards outright, distinct from traditional litigation funding. These firms offer immediate liquidity, assuming litigation risks, and are active in pre-litigation investments, such as funding investigations or acquiring IP rights. This suggests opportunities to monetize claims by selling them to such entities. The report also notes a secondary market for legal assets, indicating claims’ transferability, which could attract investors.

COCOO’s mediation strategy repositions it as a neutral facilitator, proposing a settlement to resolve disputes efficiently, avoiding costly litigation. The media campaign, using LinkedIn, X, and Meta, aims to mobilize class members and pressure public bodies, framing delays as unlawful torts. Procurement opportunities in the UK (e.g., Cabinet Office’s Payment Performance Platform) and EU (e.g., DG COMP’s consultancy tender) align with COCOO’s expertise, offering revenue streams. Spanish procurement focuses on digital transformation, which could integrate COCOO’s proposed solutions indirectly.

The primary legal ground is breach of statutory duty under EU and Spanish law, causing quantifiable damages (financing costs, lost profits, insolvencies). The Spanish Supreme Court’s ruling supports automatic compensation, while the CJEU referral strengthens EU law violation claims. Contractual breaches arise from delayed payments violating implicit terms. Potential competition law violations (TFEU Articles 101, 102) stem from market distortions favoring domestic firms. Ultra vires arguments challenge public bodies’ authority to enforce unlawful payment practices, reinforced by the Supreme Court’s nullity ruling.

To win, I would pursue a multi-pronged strategy. First, I’d build a robust claimant group by contacting firms like Ferrovial (investorrelations@ferrovial.com), Repsol (investorrelations@repsol.com), Indra (ir@indra.es), and UK companies like Serco (investorrelations@serco.com), using COCOO’s media campaign to amplify outreach. LinkedIn ads targeting CFOs and General Counsel, X posts with #FairPayNow, and Meta’s storytelling videos would drive registrations via cocoo.uk’s secure form. I’d request anonymized payment data to quantify damages, focusing on financing costs and lost opportunities.

Legally, I’d file test cases in Spanish courts, leveraging the 2016 ruling to secure indemnification for select claimants, setting precedents. Concurrently, I’d lodge a complaint with the European Commission, building on the CJEU referral, to pressure Spain. If evidence of collusion emerges, I’d pursue competition law claims against implicated Spanish firms, alleging TFEU violations. Discovery would target internal communications proving systemic negligence, countering defenses of administrative chaos by highlighting the decade-long issue.

For mediation, I’d pivot the campaign to emphasize litigation’s costs (reputational damage, legal fees, supply chain disruption) versus mediation’s efficiency. I’d propose a confidential Agreement to Mediate, leveraging COCOO’s case knowledge to bypass lengthy discovery. Confidential caucuses and joint sessions would negotiate a settlement compensating past damages and establishing a Payment Assurance Framework, including automated penalties and transparency measures.

To monetize, I’d offer contingency-based representation, taking 20-30% of recovered compensation, aligning with claimant interests. I’d explore selling mature claims to firms like Harbour (info@harbourlf.com) or Certum (info@certumgroup.com), providing immediate liquidity for claimants and revenue for COCOO. A subscription-based consultancy, offering payment tracking and advocacy tools, would target SMEs for recurring fees. Crowdfunding via cocoo.us would fund outreach, while EU/UK grants (e.g., DG COMP tender, due August 5, 2025) and fintech partnerships for blockchain solutions could yield sponsorships. I’d bid for UK’s CPS DPS and Spain’s digital transformation contracts, proposing diagnostic studies (e.g., £9,000 scoping study) to secure initial engagements, leading to larger consultancy fees.

Limitations include the lack of specific claimant data, requiring assumptions about damages. I’d need clarification on whether COCOO has direct contacts with named firms or specific claim values. Regulatory risks (e.g., disclosure requirements) and ethical concerns about third-party influence necessitate transparent agreements. If collusion evidence is weak, competition claims may falter, so I’d prioritize statutory and contractual breaches.

Would you clarify COCOO’s current relationships with potential claimants and whether specific damage data exists? Should I draft a detailed mediation agreement or focus on a sample claim or procurement bid first?

 

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CASEFILES

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The case files are letters dated March 18 and March 24, 2025, from COCOO, a UK-based organization focused on competition and consumer rights, addressed to key Spanish authorities. These letters propose a campaign to highlight Spain’s non-compliance with EU Directive 2011/7/UE, which mandates public administrations to pay invoices within 30 days (or 60 days under specific conditions). The documents detail Spain’s persistent failure to meet these deadlines, with payment delays ranging from 90 to 300 days, impacting Spanish and foreign companies, particularly British firms. The campaign seeks to raise awareness, advocate for systemic reforms, and secure compensation for affected parties, especially UK-based victims. The letters cite legal frameworks like Spain’s Law 3/2004 and Law 15/2010, a 2016 Spanish Supreme Court ruling on automatic indemnification, and EU infringement procedures initiated in 2017 and 2022, culminating in a 2023 referral to the European Court of Justice (CJEU).

The core issue is Spain’s systemic breach of EU and national payment laws, causing financial strain on businesses through liquidity issues, additional financing costs, and reduced competitiveness. The documents argue that these delays distort market competition, violate Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and harm Spain’s financial reputation. COCOO proposes solutions like creating a Public Payments Observatory, implementing progressive sanctions, establishing automatic compensation mechanisms, and adopting digital auditing systems using blockchain. The letter to the CNMC includes specific questions about its supervisory role, actions taken, and coordination with other regulators, indicating a potential legal strategy to hold authorities accountable.

Insights from the documents reveal a strong legal foundation. The CJEU referral and EU infringement procedures provide leverage, as Spain faces potential sanctions for non-compliance. The Spanish Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling strengthens the case for automatic compensation, offering a domestic legal hook. The campaign’s focus on British victims taps into post-Brexit sensitivities, potentially rallying UK stakeholders. However, challenges exist. The documents lack specific data on affected companies or quantifiable damages, weakening the evidential base. The campaign’s broad scope—addressing multiple authorities—risks diluting focus, and the proposed solutions, while innovative, may face bureaucratic resistance. The CNMC’s limited direct authority over public payment enforcement could limit its responsiveness, and the Ministry of Finance may deflect responsibility, claiming decentralized payment management.

As COCOO’s solicitor, my strategy to win the case would focus on building a robust legal and public pressure campaign while maintaining diplomatic engagement. First, I would gather concrete evidence of harm, contacting UK and European businesses operating in Spain to document specific instances of late payments, financial losses, and competitive disadvantages. This data would bolster claims under TFEU Articles 101 and 102, framing delays as anti-competitive practices. I would prepare a detailed report quantifying damages, particularly for British firms, to support compensation demands and strengthen the campaign’s credibility.

Legally, I would explore filing a formal complaint with the European Commission, building on the 2023 CJEU referral, to pressure Spain into compliance. Simultaneously, I would initiate test cases in Spanish courts, leveraging the 2016 Supreme Court ruling to secure indemnification for select clients, setting precedents for broader claims. These cases would target egregious violators among public administrations, maximizing media attention. I would also engage the CNMC directly, using the submitted questions to extract commitments or expose inaction, potentially escalating to administrative litigation if responses are inadequate.

Publicly, I would amplify the campaign through COCOO’s platforms—dedicated websites, social media, and traditional media—focusing on emotive narratives of small businesses harmed by delays. Targeting British media to highlight post-Brexit trade inequities could pressure UK diplomats to raise the issue bilaterally. I would organize roundtables with affected businesses, Spanish regulators, and EU representatives, positioning COCOO as a constructive partner while maintaining pressure for reforms. Proposing blockchain-based payment systems would appeal to tech-savvy stakeholders, enhancing the campaign’s forward-thinking image.

For monetization, I would adopt a multi-pronged approach to generate revenue while advancing the campaign. As COCOO’s solicitor, I would offer legal representation to affected businesses, particularly UK and European SMEs, on a contingency fee basis, taking a percentage of recovered compensation from successful indemnification claims. This aligns with the campaign’s goal of compensating victims and incentivizes aggressive litigation. I would also develop a subscription-based consultancy service, providing businesses with compliance advice, payment tracking tools, and advocacy support when dealing with Spanish public administrations. This service could include access to a COCOO-maintained database of payment delay trends, offering actionable insights for a fee.

To fund the campaign, I would launch a crowdfunding initiative, targeting businesses and trade associations impacted by late payments, framing contributions as investments in fairer markets. COCOO could also seek grants from EU bodies or UK trade organizations focused on post-Brexit competitiveness, positioning the campaign as a defense of cross-border trade rights. Additionally, I would explore partnerships with fintech companies developing payment solutions, offering COCOO’s endorsement of their platforms in exchange for sponsorship or revenue-sharing agreements. These partnerships could tie into the proposed blockchain auditing system, creating a scalable revenue stream if adopted by Spanish authorities.

To manage risks, I would ensure all legal actions comply with Spanish and EU procedural requirements, avoiding overreach that could discredit COCOO. I would maintain transparency in monetization efforts, clearly separating advocacy from revenue-generating activities to preserve credibility. If authorities resist engagement, I would escalate public criticism cautiously, balancing pressure with invitations to collaborate, as outlined in the letters.

In summary, the case hinges on Spain’s well-documented failure to comply with payment laws, offering a winnable opportunity through legal action, public advocacy, and strategic engagement. By combining evidence-based litigation, high-profile campaigning, and innovative monetization strategies like contingency fees, consultancy services, crowdfunding, grants, and fintech partnerships, I would aim to secure victories for affected businesses, reform Spanish payment practices, and generate sustainable revenue for COCOO. If further details on specific clients or damages are available, I can refine the strategy—please clarify if such information exists or if I should proceed with these assumptions.

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In the critical infrastructure and energy sectors, which are heavily reliant on public contracts, we can identify several key companies. The Heavy Construction industry, classified under ICB code 50101020 and falling within NACE Section F, includes Spanish giants like ACS Group (ISIN: ES0167050915) and Ferrovial (ISIN: NL0015001FS8). In the energy sector, encompassing Integrated Oil & Gas (ICB: 601010) and Alternative Electricity (ICB: 651020), firms like Spain’s Repsol (ISIN: ES0173516115), Shell plc (ISIN: GB00BP6MXD84), and the wind turbine manufacturer Siemens Energy AG (ISIN: DE000ENER6Y0) are significant players. Contact can be made through publicly listed investor relations emails, such as investorrelations@ferrovial.com and investorrelations@repsol.com.

The technology and telecommunications industries, corresponding to NACE Section J (Information and Communication) and Section C for manufacturing, are also crucial. The IT Consulting & Services subsector (ICB: 10102020) includes major government contractors like Spain’s Indra Sistemas, S.A. (ISIN: ES0118594417) and the European firm Capgemini SE (ISIN: FR0000125338). In the Aerospace sector (ICB: 50204050), a company like Airbus SE (ISIN: NL0000235190) is a critical partner for governments. Enterprise software (ICB: 10102010), essential for public administration, is dominated by firms like SAP SE (ISIN: DE0007164600). Their investor relations departments can be reached at addresses like ir@indra.es and investor_relations.global@capgemini.com.

Within the healthcare and pharmaceutical sectors, classified under NACE C 21 and Q 86 respectively, the exposure to public payment schedules is immense. The Pharmaceuticals subsector (ICB: 20101010) includes Spanish companies Grifols, S.A. (ISIN: ES0171996087) and global firms like GSK plc (ISIN: GB00BN7SWP63). The Healthcare Providers subsector (ICB: 20102030) features Germany’s Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA (ISIN: DE0005785604), which owns Spain’s largest private hospital group, Quirónsalud. These companies can be contacted via investor relations channels, such as investors@grifols.com and GSK.Investor-Relations@gsk.com.

Finally, the Business Support Services sector (ICB: 50201030), which covers outsourcing under NACE Section N 82, involves companies with extensive government contracts. UK-based firms Serco Group plc (ISIN: GB00B01G224) and Capita plc (ISIN: GB00B23K0M20) are prime examples of businesses performing essential public services and are therefore directly impacted by the payment practices of the state.